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Abstract
We appraise the role of screening for distress as part of health psychology assessment of patients newly diagnosed with can-
cer. We reviewed records of consecutive patients who accepted a health psychologist’s assessment over 4 years, examining 
convergence and divergence of the result of screening (whether patients reached threshold as ‘cases’) with the psychologist’s 
clinical judgment of need for intervention. Of 261 patients, 88 (33.7%) were ‘cases’. Of these, need for psychological interven-
tion was identified in 70 (79.5%). Of the 173 (66.3%) ‘non-cases’, need was identified in 59 (34.1%). Examination of cases 
where the psychologist’s judgment diverged from screening showed that ‘caseness’ can arise from distress that patients can 
manage themselves and, conversely, that psychological needs arise in the absence of overt distress. Formal screening may 
not identify need for psychological intervention. The psychologist’s role is to make expert judgments of patients’ current 
and future needs. Dialogue with patients should be the vehicle for assessment.
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In 2004, Liverpool Ocular Oncology Centre (LOOC) estab-
lished an innovative post for a health psychologist to offer 
psychological assessment and early intervention to every 
patient with uveal melanoma. The service remains interna-
tionally unique in its application of health psychology to this 
population, as far as we know. Nevertheless, lessons from 
it are potentially relevant for psychologists more broadly, 
particularly those working with other populations around 
the time of life threatening or life-changing diagnoses. Here, 
we consider the value of a health psychology assessment for 
patients recently diagnosed with cancer.
Uveal melanoma is a rare cancer, with around 500 new 
cases diagnosed annually in the UK. LOOC is the largest of 
four tertiary centres for uveal melanoma in the UK. Patients 
attend from across the country, being seen within 4 weeks 
of referral. Most are referred by their local ophthalmolo-
gist, having presented with visual disturbances. However, 
around a third are referred after routine eye tests and are 
asymptomatic (Damato, 2001, 2010). Most patients with 
uveal melanoma are treated 3–8 days after diagnosis. Whilst 
the primary tumour can be treated effectively, nearly half 
the patients will develop liver metastases for which there 
is no proven curative treatment (Kujala, Mäkitie, & Kivelä, 
2003). Face to face contact with LOOC staff is brief for 
most patients who receive a cancer diagnosis. They are 
treated within 1 or 2 days of their first appointment, being 
discharged soon after. Although most patients are followed 
up at LOOC after 6 months, others are discharged to their 
local hospital. While the clinical staff have a crucial sup-
portive role (Lilliehorn, Hamberg, Kero, & Salander, 2010), 
their necessarily limited contact with patients, given the pace 
at which diagnosis and treatment proceeds, constrains this. 
Therefore, LOOC established the Health Psychology Service 
to ensure that psychological needs were not neglected during 
this intense focus on clinical care. The Health Psychologist 
(HP) is a full member of the Ocular Oncology Multi-Disci-
plinary Team (MDT), routinely attending the weekly MDT 
meeting where she can discuss concerns with clinical staff 
 * Laura Hope-Stone 
 ldhs@liverpool.ac.uk
1 Liverpool Ocular Oncology Centre & Clinical 
Health Psychology Service-Cancer, Royal Liverpool 
and Broadgreen University Hospital, NHS Trust, Prescot St, 
Liverpool L7 8XP, UK
2 Institute of Psychology, Health & Society, University 
of Liverpool, Whelan Building, Brownlow Hill, 
Liverpool L69 3GB, UK
 Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical Settings
1 3
about individual patients and offer support and advice to the 
team. However, her main role is to provide assessment and 
appropriate intervention directly to patients.
The HP’s assessment is designed to determine whether 
patients have psychological needs that warrant her specific 
intervention, interpreted broadly to include emotional dis-
tress that requires intervention at the time, psychological 
needs that might not manifest as overt distress and adjust-
ment difficulties that might lead to future needs without 
early intervention. Because many patients live far away, 
psychological intervention is mostly by telephone (Watson 
et al., 2013; Watson, White, Lynch, & Mohammed, 2017). 
Intervention is based on a collaborative approach which pro-
vides a supportive context for emotional disclosure. The HP 
elicits patients’ concerns, validates normal responses, facili-
tates effective coping strategies and provides structured help 
with anxiety and worry management. The HP also needs to 
decide whether to refer patients to other agencies for more 
complex or persistent needs than she can address. Patients 
can, of course, accept or decline the HP’s intervention or 
referral; she would only over-ride this if she judged that a 
patient was at risk of harm, or harming others.
Psychological screening has become central to policy 
internationally to ensure that psychological need is recog-
nized, assessed and addressed in patients with cancer (Bren-
nan, 2012; Deshields & Nanna, 2010). However, its value 
and utility has been challenged on several grounds (Coyne, 
2013a; Salmon, Clark, McGrath, & Fisher, 2015): distress is 
‘normal’ after a traumatic diagnosis; many patients who are 
‘distressed’, in that they reach a predetermined threshold on 
a screening questionnaire, do not want psychological help 
(Coyne, 2013b); and routine psychological intervention in 
the context of normal emotional reactions to challenges can 
be detrimental (Litz, Gray, Bryant, & Adler, 2002). Further-
more, measures of distress in the absence of a psychological 
formulation do not indicate the specific intervention needed 
(Deshields & Nanna, 2010).
In our service, we screen, but do not make psychologi-
cal intervention contingent on this. Our policy is that, even 
in the absence of formal indicators of distress, the poten-
tially traumatic and life-changing experience of uveal mela-
noma entitles any patient to the opportunity to meet the HP. 
Around 70% of patients are admitted for in-patient treatment 
and are seen in person by the HP following surgery. If the 
patient agrees, the HP conducts an assessment and discusses 
the patient’s psychological needs with him/her. The assess-
ment takes the form of a conversational interview and, as 
recommended by Bonacchi et al. (2010), includes a formal 
measure of distress: the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), which is widely 
used to screen cancer populations (Vordermaier & Millman, 
2011).
The HP’s assessment and formulation is guided by the 
‘Stress and Coping Model’ (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
This postulates an ‘appraisal’ process whereby individuals 
evaluate the personal significance of challenges such as those 
in cancer diagnosis and treatment. Based on this appraisal, 
the model assumes that patients develop coping strategies 
which reflect their available personal, social and psycho-
logical resources. The HP therefore ‘interprets’ the HADS 
score according to broader information about these elements 
of the model, gained from dialogue with the patient. Cru-
cially, the HP needs to decide whether patients are likely to 
recover without her intervention, so that she does not impair 
their inherent coping ability (Brennan, 2004; Dekker et al., 
2017; Litz et al., 2002) No algorithm exists to integrate this 
information, so the HP needs to make expert clinical judg-
ments based on formulating patients’ needs. Decisions as 
to whether patients receive follow-up or referral to other 
services arise from discussing her judgment with patients 
themselves. Our approach therefore allows us to examine 
what a formal screen for distress tells us in the context of 
the broader assessment.
Based on experience in other cancer settings, and on the 
broader literature on screening for distress in cancer care, 
we anticipated that there would be a clinically significant 
proportion of patients whose psychological need diverged 
from the screening tool (Merckaert et al., 2010; Söllner, 
Maislinger, König, DeVries, & Lukas, 2004). However, 
we were unsure as to the size of this proportion in patients 
newly diagnosed with uveal melanoma. In the present study, 
we therefore sought (i) to determine to what extent HADS 
screening reflected patients’ psychological needs as identi-
fied by the HP and (ii) to identify reasons for any divergence 
of the HP’s judgment from the result of screening.
Methods
This study was approved as a service evaluation by the Royal 
Liverpool & Broadgreen University Hospital Trust Clinical 
Effectiveness Department (TA 1840) and was performed in 
accordance with ethical standards as specified in the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki. We reviewed clinical records of all 
patients who accepted a routine health psychology assess-
ment over 4 years (April 2014–March 2018), noting also 
the final decision recorded about whether the HP thought 
that post-discharge psychological intervention was necessary 
and the score on the HADS administered during the assess-
ment. We categorized patients according to probable clinical 
‘caseness’, using a criterion of ≥ 8 (Vodermaier & Millman, 
2011) on either HADS subscale (anxiety or depression). We 
noted demographic and clinical variables from patients’ clin-
ical records. Variables used in statistical analyses included 
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gender, age (categorized by a median split) and treatment 
(enucleation vs. conservative treatments).
To determine the extent of convergence and divergence 
between the two ways of categorizing patients, we cross-
tabulated HADS caseness with the HP’s clinical judgment 
as to whether the patient needed psychological intervention 
using χ2 to test the significance of the relationship (signifi-
cance criterion p < .05). We then used χ2 to explore whether 
HADS caseness and the HP’s judgment of psychological 
need were related to gender, age or treatment. Finally, we 
used log linear analysis to explore the 3-way interactions of 
HADS caseness and the HP’s judgment with each of gender, 
age or treatment; that is, to show whether these variables 
were related to the convergence or divergence between case-
ness and the HP’s judgment. After checking for conformity 
with assumptions, we fitted a saturated log linear model, 
examining evidence of 3-way and higher order effects before 
proceeding to test individual effects. We report Pearson χ2 
throughout the results (likelihood ratio χ2 produced similar 
results). To protect against Type 1 errors in the exploratory 
analyses, our significance criterion for these was p < .01. We 
used SPSS v24 for statistical analyses.
To identify reasons for convergence and divergence we 
reviewed the HP’s clinical records. To illustrate the reasons 
we created case vignettes based on assessments of individual 
patients falling into each of the four cells resulting from 
cross-tabulation of HADS caseness with the HP’s judgment. 
We categorized these as ‘true’ or ‘false’ ‘positives’ or ‘nega-
tives’, regarding the HP’s judgment as the ‘gold standard’. 
To preserve anonymity we amalgamated features from dif-
ferent assessments and omitted or changed any potentially 
identifying characteristics and biographical events.
Results
Sample Characteristics
Records identified 261 patients, 128 women and 133 men, 
with a median age of 65  years (32–88) who had been 
assessed and had completed the HADS. Patients’ character-
istics are summarized in Table 1. The HADS classified 88 
(33.7%; Table 2) as cases of anxiety, 23 of these also being 
cases of depression (none reached threshold on the depres-
sion scale alone). The HP identified psychological need in 
129 patients (49.4%; Table 2).
Statistical Analyses
HADS caseness was highly associated with psychological 
need χ2 = 48.18, df = 1, p < .001. Of the 88 patients reach-
ing caseness, the HP identified 70 (79.5%) as having psy-
chological need; in 18 (20.5%), however, she identified no 
psychological need. Of the 173 patients scoring below the 
HADS caseness threshold, the HP identified no psychologi-
cal need in 114 (65.9%), but did identify psychological need 
in 59 (34.1%). Therefore while, as anticipated, the HADS 
and the HP’s judgment converged for most patients, they 
diverged for 77 (29.5%), a substantial minority.
Female gender was associated with both HADS caseness 
(χ2 = 9.62, df = 1, p < .01) and the HP’s judgment of psycho-
logical need (χ2 = 15.19, df = 1, p < .001), but age and treat-
ment were unrelated to both. In the log linear analysis, 3-way 
and higher order effects were not significant (χ2 = 4.91, 
df = 5, p = .43), indicating that whether HADS screening and 
the HP’s judgment converged or diverged was unrelated to 
patients’ demographic and clinical characteristics.
Case Vignettes
Boxes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 illustrate patients for whom HADS 
‘caseness’ and the HP’s judgment converged or diverged.
Most patients scored below threshold for’ caseness’ and, 
in most of these, the HP identified no psychological need. 
It seemed that these patients successfully ‘disavowed’ the 
Table 1  Socio-demographic and clinical characteristics of patients 
assessed by the HP
a Examination of eye for signs of recurrence
Variable Category N = 261
N %
Sex Male 133 51
Female 128 49
Marital status Married/living with partner 184 70.5
Divorced/separated 14 5.4
Widowed 20 7.7
Single 24 9.2
Not recorded 19 7.3
Employment status Employed 101 38.7
Homemaker 9 3.4
Retired 125 47.5
Unemployed 1 0.4
Not working because of long-term 
illness
1 0.4
Not recorded 24 9.2
Treatment Enucleation 63 24.1
Eye conserved
 Plaque radiotherapy 167 64
 Endoresection 2 0.8
 Endoresection & plaque 14 5.4
 Local resection & plaque 7 2.7
 Tantalum marker insertion before 
proton beam radiotherapy
7 2.7
 Examination under  anaesthetica 1 0.4
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Table 2  Numbers of patients in 
whom need for psychological 
intervention was identified, and 
whom the HADS classified as 
cases
Need for psychological 
intervention
HADS cases & non-cases
Anxiety or depression ‘case’ Anxiety or depression ‘non-case’
Total Males Females Total Males Females
Total 88 33 55 173 100 73
Need identified 70 23 47 59 27 32
Need not identified 18 10 8 114 73 41
Box 1  (P1) A ‘true negative’: HADS non-case in whom the HP identified no psychological need (in this and subsequent boxes, case examples 
are summarized according to the essential elements of the ‘stress and coping’ model; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984)
Male, 65–75 years
HADS: Anxiety = 3; Depression = 1
Personal significance of cancer diagnosis: P1 felt that diagnosis would have little effect on his life, although he was concerned about how any 
loss of vision might affect activities such as driving and golf
Coping: Minimized the seriousness of his diagnosis and wanted to ‘get back to normal’. Doctors had found it early so ‘it would be fine’
Personal & psychological resources: Typically approaches difficulties by playing them down to maintain normality; readily accepts offers of 
practical help
Support: Large extended circle of family and friends ready to offer practical help
P1 maintained that the diagnosis was just ‘one of those things’ that he would deal with it by resuming his normal life as soon, and as best, he 
could. He had a pragmatic approach to potential loss of vision. The HP judged that the low HADS scores were in line with his ways of cop-
ing; that is, by minimizing the diagnosis while focusing realistically on resuming familiar activities after treatment, and in light of his support 
network, he should be expected to adjust without formal intervention
Box 2  (P2) A ‘true positive’: HADS case in whom the HP identified psychological need
Female, 35–45 years
HADS: Anxiety = 19; Depression = 10
Personal significance of cancer diagnosis: Confirms long-held belief that ‘bad things’ happen to her
Coping: Worrying, catastrophic thinking; threat monitoring; withdrawal from family
Personal & psychological resources: Recent sudden bereavement and pre-existing depression leave her ill equipped to cope with the cancer 
diagnosis
Social Support: Close family
P2 asked to speak with the HP before treatment. Consistent with the HADS score, the HP saw that P2 was extremely upset by her diagnosis 
which, she felt, confirmed her belief that fate was against her. The HP was concerned that P2 described trying to withdraw emotionally from 
her young children because ‘I may not be around.’ Against a background of long-standing anxiety, profound grief and low mood, the HP con-
sidered that her ways of coping risked compounding her distress and that she therefore needed psychological intervention
Box 3  (P3) A ‘true positive’: HADS case in whom the HP identified psychological need
Female, 35–45 years
HADS: Anxiety = 16; Depression = 10
Personal significance of cancer diagnosis: Challenged her view of herself as a strong, capable and optimistic person and her expectations of 
being able to continue in her family and work roles, particularly raising her young children into adulthood
Coping: Worrying about the future; organizing her finances to make her death easier for her family
Personal & psychological resources: In response to previous crises, she had relied on a sense of optimism, linked to her religious belief, and a 
confidence in her own strength, but each of these beliefs had been greatly weakened by her diagnosis
Social Support: Did not feel supported by partner; felt she had no-one else to share her feelings
P2 initially presented to the HP assertively as a strong person who was coping well. However, as the HP prompted her to talk more, she 
described feeling uncharacteristically pessimistic. She disclosed that her attempts to be optimistic were failing and that she was questioning her 
religious beliefs. She told the HP that she was very anxious about her family should she die. The HP judged that her familiar coping strategies 
were proving ineffective and that she lacked effective alternative ways of coping and had little available emotional support. She was therefore 
judged at risk of persistent distress and needed the HP’s help
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significance of their cancer diagnosis (Salander & Windahl, 
1999). For example, P1’s (Box 1) account to the HP showed 
how he ‘minimized’ the diagnosis, focusing instead on get-
ting on with his life. In those patients who reached ‘case-
ness’ and whom the HP judged as needing psychological 
intervention, there were diverse reasons for her judgment. 
For many patients, given their recent diagnosis, distress was 
understandable and linked to concerns about cancer recur-
rence and implications for family. In several, however, as P2 
illustrates (Box 2), the HP identified that distress predated 
diagnosis, being linked to long-standing emotional problems 
or recent life events. In other patients, she was able to link 
patients’ distress to contemporaneous stressors, including 
family responsibilities or relationship problems not directly 
related to their own diagnosis. Although most patients who 
reached HADS ‘caseness’ and whom the HP assessed as 
needing psychological intervention wanted further support, 
a few did not initially see its potential value, only doing so 
Box 4  (P4) A ‘false positive’: HADS case in whom the HP did not identify psychological need
Male, 55–65 years
HADS: Anxiety = 12; Depression = 7
Personal significance of cancer diagnosis: Frightened by potential loss of vision and consequent challenge to ability to work and provide for 
family
Coping: Information seeking; distraction; social comparison (with other people who were “worse off”); keeping ‘positive’ and not ‘dwelling’ on 
his problems
Personal & psychological resources: Has been resilient in the face of previous serious illnesses, and is drawing on ability to frame adverse 
events positively. He is confident in his ability to apply the same approach to this current diagnosis
Social support: Supportive network of family and friends
Although P4 was shocked and frightened by his diagnosis but, despite the elevated HADS scores, the HP was reassured by his continued ability 
to use ways of coping which had served him well previously and conferred resilience which was likely to protect him from persistent distress. 
The HP judged it important not to risk undermining his own way of coping, and therefore simply explained that support was available, should 
he want it
Box 5  (P5) A ‘false negative’: HADS non-case in whom the HP identified psychological need
Male, 65–75 years
HADS: Anxiety = 6; Depression = 4
Personal significance of cancer diagnosis: Knew he was at risk of liver metastases. A close friend had recently died of liver cancer and he 
feared for his family’s loss of his ‘guiding role’ were he to develop incurable metastases
Coping: Internet searching about his condition and treatment; asking others’ opinions; worrying about dying from cancer and about how his 
family will cope
Personal & psychological resources: Likes to seek information and deliberate about decisions
Social support: Close to partner and wider family, but sees himself as the support for them rather vice versa
P5 had been offered a prognostic biopsy to estimate risk of liver metastases. One family member was strongly advising him against it but, in 
searching for information beyond what he had been told by the clinical team, and in trying to weigh the advantages and disadvantages, P5 felt 
in a cycle of uncertainty and Internet searching that left him more confused and undecided. Despite not expressing overt distress to the HP, she 
judged that his habitual ways of approaching decisions were proving counter-productive. Drawing on health psychology and other literature on 
decision-making, she suggested that she help guide him through his deliberation. P5 enthusiastically accepted
Box 6  (P6) A ‘false negative’: HADS non-case in whom the HP identified psychological need
Female, 60–70 years
HADS: Anxiety = 4; Depression = 3
Personal significance of cancer diagnosis: Challenged her view of herself as someone her family could depend on in adversity. Exposed her 
vulnerability to ill health as she aged
Coping: Worrying
Personal & psychological.resources: Had typically responded to family and other difficulties by focusing on others’ needs and seeking to be a 
dependable, resourceful support for them
Support: Did not feel she could ‘burden’ her family with her own feelings
P6 worried about her daughter who was herself experiencing a life-changing illness. Now anticipating her own ageing and decline, P6 feared 
being unable to support her daughter in future when she most needed her. The HP judged that, whilst not overtly distressed, P6 warranted 
help in negotiating her life transitions in light of the cancer diagnosis. P6 was positive when offered this help, which provided opportunity for 
emotional expression and normalization of her accepting support from others
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after discussion with the HP. P3 (Box 3), for example, came 
to realize that ways of coping that had seen her through pre-
vious challenges were insufficient for her cancer diagnosis 
and that support she had previously relied upon would not 
be available. Twelve further patients steadfastly declined the 
HP’s offer of support. In such cases it is important that the 
HP ensures that patients know how to contact her should 
their needs, or attitude to having help, change.
For those reaching ‘caseness’ on the HADS, the HP 
assessed several as not needing psychological intervention 
because they were experiencing natural emotional reactions 
to the shock of diagnosis which she judged they could man-
age without professional intervention. For example, based on 
eliciting P4’s (Box 4) account of how he coped with previ-
ous ill health, the HP agreed with his own appraisal that he 
could manage his new diagnosis without help. That is, the 
HP assessed these patients as having resources that would 
allow them to adjust and recover over time, and she did not 
wish to undermine this natural process.
Of the patients whom the HADS did not identify as reach-
ing caseness, the HP judged most as not needing psycho-
logical intervention because she identified social support, 
appraisals and ways of coping that helped protect these 
patients and that equipped them for the future. The minority 
whom she assessed as having psychological needs showed 
diverse reasons for this judgment. They had needs that were 
clearly psychological, although not manifesting as overt 
distress. For instance, P5 (Box 5) was finding it difficult to 
decide whether to have a prognostic biopsy. Discussion with 
the HP showed that his usual approach to difficult decisions 
was proving problematic. Internet searching had increased 
his uncertainty and seeking others’ opinions left him suscep-
tible to the strong views of a family member. The HP judged 
that she could help him by drawing on recent theory about 
what constitutes a ‘good’ health-care decision (Elwyn & 
Miron-Shatz, 2009; Salmon & Brown, 2018) and he enthu-
siastically accepted. A few patients described psychological 
needs around life transitions associated with their cancer. 
For instance, through discussion with the HP, P6 (Box 6) 
came to appreciate how her reaction to the cancer diagnosis 
had challenged her view of herself as a ‘rock’ of support for 
her adult family. The HP helped her become able to accept 
her new feeling of vulnerability by having support from the 
HP.
Discussion
For most patients, the HADS score and the HPs’ assessment 
were aligned. However, they were misaligned in nearly 30% 
of patients, and these cases have important lessons for HPs 
and others involved in psychological assessment and support 
in a cancer context.
Emotional Distress Does Not Necessarily Indicate 
a Need for Psychological Intervention
In our clinical context, much of the distress that screen-
ing identifies is a natural reaction to extraordinary circum-
stances. This acute distress reaction is transient in most 
people (Brennan, 2004; Gao, Bennett, Stark, Murray, & 
Higginson, 2010; Helgeson, Snyder, & Seltman, 2004), and 
the HP needs to avoid interfering with the natural adjustment 
processes that limit this reaction (Dekker et al., 2017). Con-
sistent with this view, many patients distressed by a cancer 
diagnosis prefer to rely on their own resources in the period 
immediately after diagnosis, becoming open to psychologi-
cal intervention only later (Baker et al., 2013). Even then, 
distress does not necessarily equate to psychological need 
(Merckaert et al., 2010; Söllner, Maislinger, König, DeVries, 
& Lukas, 2004). The HP therefore must make careful clini-
cal judgments about the level of involvement to offer. She 
must decide whether her intervention risks undermining 
the natural coping of patients, such as P4, who have the 
resources to manage without her help, or whether it could 
help patients, such as P2, who seem to lack those.
Patients diagnosed with cancer commonly use emotion-
focused coping strategies such as social comparison (Ben-
nenbroek, Buunk, van der Zee, & Grol, 2002), thinking 
‘positively’ (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2000) and minimizing 
the seriousness of the diagnosis, as P1 illustrated. Salander 
and Windahl (1999) described these as examples of ‘disa-
vowal’ whereby, without denying the reality of the diagno-
sis, patients interpret it in a way that feels more manage-
able. Similarly, a long-standing view in health psychology 
is that positive thinking in patients with cancer can help 
to reduce emotional distress (Dunkel-Schetter, Feinstein, 
Taylor, & Falke, 1992; Osowiecki & Compas, 1998). How-
ever, an opposing view is that, by suppressing emotional 
expression, emotion-focused coping of this kind increases 
vulnerability to future distress (Brennan, 2004; Stanton 
et al., 2000). Given this conflicting evidence, the HP must 
decide whether patients’ coping is likely to be protective or 
potentially harmful.
Predictions about the future therefore underlie the HP’s 
assessment of patients’ needs. That is, she must make clini-
cal judgments based on her assessment of how patients are 
likely to adjust and cope, with or without intervention. There 
is some evidence to help her: risk factors for poor adjustment 
include poor social support (Nordin, Berglund, Glimelius, 
& Sjödén, 2001), anxiety and depression around the time of 
diagnosis, personality traits predisposing patients to anxiety 
and a history of pre-morbid psychological problems (Cook, 
Salmon, Hayes, Byrne, & Fisher, 2018). Consistent with 
Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical Settings 
1 3
previous evidence, distress in the present study was unre-
lated to whether treatment had cost patients the affected eye 
(Hope-Stone, Brown, Heimann, Damato, & Salmon, 2016). 
Our finding that women were more likely than men to be dis-
tressed, and to be judged as needing psychological interven-
tion, reflects previous findings in studies of cancer generally 
and uveal melanoma specifically although, contrary to pre-
vious evidence, there was no evidence that younger people 
were more likely to be distressed (Hope-Stone et al., 2016; 
Linden,Vodermaier, Mackenzie, & Grieg, 2012; Merckaert 
et al., 2010). In general, the evidence about predictors of 
distress therefore remains too limited to provide an algo-
rithm that could be used in clinical practice. Therefore, the 
HP must make a clinical judgment that reflects, not just the 
broad features of that evidence, but patients’ specific charac-
teristics and circumstances. The approach we have described 
here, drawing on the stress and coping framework, allows 
the HP to derive predictions based on a way of formulating 
patients’ needs and resources that is rooted in health psy-
chology theory. Of course, predictions in this sense are not 
fixed; they are guides to action for the HP, whose continuing 
dialogue with the patient allows her continually to revise her 
formulation and the predictions that result from it.
Patients Can Have Psychological Needs That are Not 
Manifest as Emotional Distress
In our survey, the HP judged that further intervention might 
help more than a third of the patients who were not formally 
distressed on the HADS. That is, her assessment identified 
needs that, although psychological, were not manifest in a 
‘clinical’ level of distress. Of course, any screening instru-
ment has some degree of unreliability, so some of these 
patients might have been clinically distressed. However, 
in cancer care generally, patients’ distress measured on a 
screening instrument correlates only poorly or not at all 
with their desire for formal psychological support (Merc-
kaert et al., 2010; Söllner et al., 2004). It seems, therefore, 
that patients seek psychological help for reasons that are not 
necessarily manifest as distress detectable on the HADS. 
Salander (2010) described some of these reasons when he 
audited referrals to a psycho-oncology service; diagnosis of 
cancer can expose pre-existing inter-personal problems, or it 
can bring challenges in adjusting to a changed life situation.
Patients in our survey also needed to make important 
decisions about medical intervention options. Given the 
evidence (Cook et al., 2011; Peters, McCaul, Stefanek, & 
Nelson, 2006) that patients typically make decisions using 
heuristic ‘short-cuts’ that might not reflect their best inter-
ests, the HP can provide psychologically informed guidance, 
for example by helping them anticipate potential outcomes 
and how they are likely to respond (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 
2010). The challenge for the HP is, therefore, to recognize 
and respond to needs that are ‘psychological’ but do not 
present as overt emotional distress.
Psychologists Need to Escape the Medical Model 
of Psychological Need
Equating need with distress reflects the persistence of a med-
ical, ‘diagnostic’ model of psychological need. By contrast, 
Salmon et al. (2015) argued for a broader, ‘public health’ 
framework which recognizes that need can be identified 
in different ways: ‘normative need’ identified by experts; 
‘comparative need’, where a criterion for need that is estab-
lished in one population is used in another; ‘felt need’, when 
patients want help; and ‘expressed need’ when they seek 
help. The use of a questionnaire such as the HADS, which 
is validated against psychiatrists’ judgments, reflects only 
normative and comparative need. Coyne (2013b) argued that 
screening for distress could rely, instead, on patients’ own 
views of their needs—i.e. felt and expressed need. How-
ever, such reliance risks denying some patients help that 
they might benefit from; patients can be unaware of what 
professional support can offer, or they might reject it because 
they think that they do not warrant help. Moreover, patients’ 
initial assertions that they can manage without help might 
well be expressions of psychological need, as P3 (Box 3) 
illustrated. Some patients in our study only accepted the 
HP’s help after discussion in which the HP could explain 
its purpose and nature. Therefore, the HP’s responsibility 
to judge psychological need can no more be delegated to 
patients by asking whether or not they want help than it 
can be based solely on a HADS score. Whether need exists 
in any patient reflects a weighing of the different criteria 
for need. Where they align, need is generally unambiguous. 
Where they do not, the HP must make a clinical judgment.
Conclusion: Dialogue with the Patient 
as the Vehicle for Psychological Assessment
In our service, the HP’s assessment is based on dialogue 
with the patient, informed and structured by health psy-
chology theory. Compared to this, a questionnaire, which 
is widely used to screen for psychological need in cancer 
services, often proved misleading. Similarly, Bonacchi 
et al. (2010) found that using clinical interviews allowed 
psychologists to identify psychological need in more 
patients than those who, based on questionnaire scores, 
would have met criteria for distress. Our observations 
therefore reverse the conclusion of previous reports that, 
compared to formal screening questionnaires, practition-
ers’ judgments of patients’ psychological needs are often 
inaccurate (Mitchell, Hussain, Grainger, & Symonds, 
2011; Singer et  al., 2011). Those reports, in effect, 
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regarded the screening questionnaire as a ‘gold standard’, 
disregarding the inevitably imperfect reliability of ques-
tionnaires and excluding the kinds of considerations that 
contributed to the HP’s assessment in our unit. Whilst a 
screening tool can be informative, we argue, consistent 
with Bonacchi et al.’s (2010) advice, that dialogue with 
patients is essential for a professional judgment of whether 
psychological need exists, and whether psychological 
intervention is warranted.
By contrast, current health policy tries to simplify iden-
tification of psychological need in cancer care so that it 
does not require a psychologist, by using formal measures 
of distress to indicate need. Even if the non-psychological 
practitioners administering such screening instruments 
were to look beyond the formal result of screening, it is 
not clear to what extent their judgments could reflect the 
kinds of considerations that shape those of a psychologi-
cal practitioner such as the HP, who is psychologically 
trained and supervised, and whose judgments are informed 
by psychological theory. Currently in UK cancer care, 
many nurses are now trained in Holistic Needs Assess-
ment (HNA) which comprises a ‘concerns thermometer’ 
and problem checklist to assess patients’ current sources 
of concern, including distress but also physical symptoms 
and practical problems (Young, Cund, Renshaw, Quig-
ley, & Snowden, 2015). While guidance around the HNA 
emphasizes the importance of dialogue, it is confined to 
specific concerns that patients are able to express, i.e. 
‘expressed need’ in the public health framework, above. 
We acknowledge that it may be the best that services with-
out a HP can do, but it is unlikely to substitute for expert 
psychological assessment. Nevertheless, clinical staff 
involved in screening will need to be alert to the limita-
tions of screening. They need to avoid withholding help 
from patients who require it but do not manifest distress 
on a screening instrument or, conversely, intervening when 
distress signifies a normal process of adjustment. Future 
research, training and evaluation will need to examine how 
clinical staff can depart from screening algorithms and 
use dialogue with the patient to assess for psychological 
need. Of course, screening for distress is only effective 
to the extent that a service can address any needs that 
are identified. Having a psychologist in a service provides 
for addressing needs as well as identifying them. Indeed, 
the dialogue of the assessment itself starts the process of 
intervention.
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